I continue to read through the massive Project 2025, which has been criticized both seriously and comically, and which has become something of a stain from which the Trump Campaign has tried to distance itself, although it has been written by many former Trump appointees and with a future Trump (or Trump-like) administration in mind. The next major section of P2025 is a chapter entitled “Central Personnel Agencies: Managing the Bureaucracy” (p. 69 of the document; p.101 of the online version,) By Donald Devine, Dennis Dean Kirk, and Paul Dans. I begin with two notes.
First, a few words about one of the principal authors, Paul Dans. Dans was the Director of the P2025 initiative but left the project in August and is now working on a number of issues to which he refers as “election integrity” issues. According to this article by Ken Bensinger, one of those issues is a restoration of “Schedule F” classifications for many federal jobs. Schedule F, passed during the Trump administration but rescinded by President Biden, makes it easier to fire civil servants and replace them with party loyalists. And there’s this quote from Bensinger’s article: “The heart of the Heritage Foundation-funded project, Mr. Dans said, was a database of roughly 20,000 party loyalists who were vetted and ready to fill positions in a Republican administration.” In other words, Mr. Dans' essay is part of a larger planned effort to rid the government’s bureaucracy of civil servants, not necessarily based on their job performance or integrity, but on whether they are deemed “faithful” enough to serve the President’s agenda. Again, one must ask, “What if a President’s agenda conflicts with legal, ethical, or constitutional integrity?” I wish that were a ridiculous question, since presidents take oaths swearing fidelity to the constitution. After January 6, 2021, it no longer seems like a ridiculous question to me.
Second, I read this section as a person whose father was a civil servant, working for NASA throughout my childhood. I remember well how often my parents would try to make plans for the forthcoming year, deciding whether they could afford a home improvement project or a family vacation to a state park, but could only be tentative about it, because Dad did not know whether he would get a COLA or not. His job – and our family’s livelihood as a result – was always something of a political football. He was a model-maker, making wings or aeronautical models to test in the wind tunnels, hence one of many civil servants who were subject annually to political whims or an ambitious politician’s plans to curry popularity by cutting costs. Those conversations are important, no doubt, but the politicization of those conversations have always struck me as the primary reason why bureaucracy has a bad name. A government serving a country of over 330 million people is a tall task, easy to criticize and difficult to manage well. Therefore, there will always be a reason for people to address “managing the bureaucracy” as this chapter does.
Dans et al give an overview of numerous attempts to manage the civil service, going back to the Carter administration. No doubt it is a daunting task. One issue he finds important is his argument that the unionization of government workers is incompatible with government management, invoking none other than President Franklin Roosevelt for his case. He lauds three executive orders that the Trump administration issued, each of which tries to empower management over unions. Note the phrase “management rights.”
Executive Order 13836, encouraging agencies to renegotiate all union collective bargaining agreements to ensure consistency with the law and respect for management rights; Executive Order 13837, encouraging agencies to prevent union representatives from using official time preparing or pursuing grievances or from engaging in other union activity on government time; Executive Order 13839, encouraging agencies both to limit labor grievances on removals from service or on challenging performance appraisals and to prioritize performance over seniority when deciding who should be retained following reductions-in-force.
It’s the next section where it feels that the issue comes to a head: “Fully Staffing the Ranks of Political Appointees.” The writers say that a President is constitutionally required to fill top political positions in the executive branch and admit that most Presidents have struggled to do so because of the requirement for congressional approval. Let me interject that the requirement for congressional approval is as much a part of the government’s process of checks and balances as anything else, but this essay seems to see that part of the process as a problem. They argue that President Trump faced special hostility from democrats and the media in getting his appointees considered and approved. There are clearly two sides to this argument and numerous other administrations that might feel the same.
In the end, this chapter is another argument in a long history of two familiar tendencies – to prefer managerial rights over employee rights, and to de-centralizing much of civil service from Federal to State responsibilities – the point of which seems to ensure a structure that is not accountable to checks and balances but compliant to a president’s will, even if it is harmful to the common good.
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