Final look at Project 2025

This will be my last post regarding Project 2025. I wish I could continue to blog through it, but I am ready to focus my attention for this blog elsewhere. With P2025, I am finding that chapter after chapter, essay after essay, I am seeing the same pattern. The document has the potential to offer tremendous insights into important and ongoing conversations about how to shape our government in an ever-changing world. To that extent, there is a lot to learn from P2025. On the other hand, the shape of the document is not at all conducive to being part of an ongoing conversation. It is too devoted to a single vision, as if any benefit here can only be helpful to conservatism. To wit, consider opening words of the essay on the “Intelligence Community” by Dustin J. Carmack. It begins with this “mission statement”: 

“To arm a future incoming conservative President with the knowledge and tools necessary to fortify the United States Intelligence Community; to defend against all foreign enemies and ensure the security and prosperity of our sovereign nation, devoid of all political motivations; and to maintain constitutional civil liberties” (p. 201.)

I suppose that this “mission statement” is meant to describe the mission of this chapter, and not the Intelligence Community [IC] itself, since it is directed specifically to an incoming conservative President. After reading further, my thought was that some of the arguments here would benefit a future President who is not conservative. So why – this is a serious question – why is the “mission” of this chapter to arm a conservative President?  What is the disposition of this chapter if the next President is not conservative? What of future Presidents that may not be conservative? Do any of the arguments here apply outside of a specific political perspective? And how does that narrow focus at the beginning of the mission statement cohere with the phrase that follows, “devoid of all political motivations”? If the mission of a plan to create an apolitical apparatus is itself professedly political, is it not manifestly hypocritical?

If the context of the other essays in P2025 shows us anything, it is that the phrase, “devoid of all political motivations” is meant to suggest that the current iteration of the Intelligence Community is too politically motivated, or is too motivated by the wrong politics. And, true to form, here it is on p.204, “Finally, the future IC leadership must address the widely promoted ‘woke’ culture that has spread throughout the federal government with identity politics and ‘social justice’ advocacy replacing such traditional American values as patriotism, colorblindness, and even workplace competence.” But wait, there’s more. On p. 212 Carmack has a section entitled “Preventing the Abuse of Intelligence for Partisan Purposes.” And here is a glimpse at how the IC can practice its political neutrality: “rectify the damage done by the actions of former IC leaders and personnel regarding the claims of Trump-Russia collusion following the 2016 elections and the suppression of the Hunter Biden laptop investigation and media revelations of its existence during the 2020 election.” This rank politically partisan operating instruction flies in the face of Carmack’s earlier pseudo-neutrality when he envisioned an IC “devoid of all political motivations.” 

On p. 213, Carmack begins a bullet-pointed list of norms and virtues that would help restore the integrity of the IC. It begins with clearing house and removing some personnel, goes on to look into past politicizations and abuses, and suggest ways to prevent current and past personnel from speaking to the press without authorization. Carmack also has a number of arguments for stricter controls over how IC information is gathered, shared, and processed for critical use. Again, much of this information seems insightful and very consequential for the work of the IC. But, also again, it is highly politicized in it entire orientation. If the issues described here are integral to the IC itself, why must it be cast specifically for a conservative administration? When it is pointed in that direction, it seems that the warnings and processes for silencing whistle-blowers are all about protecting certain points of view while highlighting others. Isn’t that exactly the kind of partisanship that Carmack’s phrase “devoid of all political motivations” intends to avoid? 

In the end, reading this chapter makes me envision a future conservative administration that re-centers Hunter Biden's laptop, dismisses Russian election interference concerns, and goes on a witch hunt against personnel deemed too “woke” and attentive to “social justice” (remember when Glenn Beck tried to make “social justice” a bad thing?). In doing so, I wonder how the IC would benefit from such a blatant radical reorientation smothered with the pretense of being patriotic and non-political. It would be a perfect tool for a president who wants to spend more energy seeking revenge over past grievances than facing a world of current challenges.

Final note: There is an author’s note concluding this chapter that says it is a collective work and therefore no statement, recommendation or view expressed should be attributed to a particular contributor. With respect to that, please read my previous remarks about “Carmack” to mean “Carmack and his collaborators.” 

The State Department - For the People or the Person?

As we continue reading through the Heritage Foundation’s P2025, we arrive at chapter 6, “The Department of State,” by Kiron K. Skinner. Skinner was part of the Trump administration at the State Department, teaches at Pepperdine University, and is associated with the Hoover Institution and Heritage Foundation. The State Department is a critical part of the US Government, as close to a “Peace Department” as we have to correspond with the “War Department” that we looked at over my last two entries. 

Skinner begins by saying, “The U.S. Department of State’s mission is to bilaterally, multilaterally, and regionally implement the President’s foreign policy priorities; to serve U.S. citizens abroad; and to advance the economic, foreign policy, and national security interests of the United States.” Let’s compare that to the mission statement of the Department of State (https://www.state.gov/about/): “To protect and promote U.S. security, prosperity, and democratic values and shape an international environment in which all Americans can thrive.” To be sure, the State Department’s website does say that the Secretary of State “carries out the President’s foreign policies through the State Department, which includes the Foreign Service, Civil Service, and U.S. Agency for International Development.” So, there is no question that the President is elected and given then power to set policies that the State Department carries out. But there is a world of difference in making the historic mission of the State department the starting point, rather than starting with presidential power. And that is the framework with which I want to discuss Skinner’s essay. 

Skinner notes on p.203 that there is always a tug-of-war between Presidents and bureaucracies within the State Department. She argues that it is more pronounced whenever the President is conservative, because “large swaths of the State Department’s workforce are left-wing and predisposed to disagree with a conservative President’s policy agenda and vision.” That song is becoming almost laughably predictable in this document. Whether Skinner is correct or not, the tension between career diplomats and elected officials should not come as a surprise. Let me illustrate. Say a diplomat has been working for many years with her counterpart from a country with which the U.S. has strained relations. Through connections and experience, she may know that sometimes the leadership of that country will make claims that sound volatile but serve mostly to placate the extreme elements within the country with little real effect. An incoming President would not be expected to know such things and might be inclined to respond in a way that causes more damage than it solves. The career diplomat, then would face a matter of conscience. Using the language of the State Department’s mission, how does one promote the “security, prosperity, and democratic values” of the U.S. when a President’s ill-advised action would harm them? Or, to use Skinner’s own language, how does one “advance the national security interests” of the U.S. when a President’s direction might set them back? And while it is easy for me to imagine someone as impetuous as former President Trump ignoring the wisdom of a career diplomat, it is equally possible for any number of potential presidents. Being a state Governor, a Senator, or a Representative – as most candidates for presidency left and right tend to be – may not equip someone for choosing the path of wisdom. 

That is why the thrust of P2025 is so disconcerting. By repeatedly accusing career civil servants of being “woke,” or “left-wing,” and representing unconstitutional challenges to a President’s will, this document actually predisposes a conservative President to ignore much of the hard-earned wisdom of career diplomats, rather than inviting their voice into the decision-making process. That disposition is clear when Skinner says, “No one in a leadership position on the morning of January 20 should hold that position at the end of the day” (p.205). No one. Not a single person. There is no criteria for evaluating who must go, just everyone who wakes up that morning employed in a leadership position should lie down that night unemployed. Because they committed the atrocious act of working for a previous administration. 

If that is the attitude of a future incoming administration – or if that was the “drain the swamp” attitude of the Trump administration back when Skinner worked for him before – it is no wonder that career servants seem resistant to it. 

Mark of St. Mark

The Department of Defen(ding our political perspective)

 In my last entry, I began looking at the section of the Heritage Foundation’s “Project 2025” on the Department of Defense, by Christopher Miller.  There’s a lot about this chapter that is beyond my scope of knowledge, especially when it comes to the particulars of different types of tanks, nuclear arsenal, and so forth. So, I cannot and will not address any of those topics either positively or negatively. There are, however, some aspects of Miller’s essay worth noting.

First, it seems that all of the essays in P2025 are required to give lip service to dismissing critical race theory along with diversity, equity, and inclusion programs. I know military veterans who take a lot of pride in how the US Army was one of first institutions in America to defy color codes and treat people of different colors equally. Of course it was not a blemish-free process by any means, but the Army did pursue an intentional process of overcoming its own history of racism. I imagine back then they had folks arguing that such a focus was harming their mission also. Sigh.

Likewise, there seems to be a requirement for these essays to decry Marxist ideology and indoctrination everywhere. Miller follows suit. None of this ideology is spelled out, though, so one is left wondering if the kind of Marxism he has in mind would include the base housing and spousal support that he argues is necessary for enlisted personnel. Believe me, I am all for improving base housing and providing services that make it easier for families when someone is stationed to move or deployed and has to go away. I agree with Miller that government-provided childcare and employment assistance seems to be something we are obliged to offer when families make such sacrifices. I just want to point out that those are precisely the kinds of programs that fall under the criticism of being “socialist” when they are suggested for anyone else. So, perhaps some kinds of Marxist ideas or programs might be worth discussing, rather than simply employing the bugaboo term to suggest nefarious forces at work. 

And finally, Miller suggests reinstating service members to active duty who were discharged for not receiving the COVID vaccine. Those service members refused direct orders based on the kind of objective science that Miller argues elsewhere should be required of all military decisions. Medical science is not opinion or indoctrination, just because someone’s political loyalties require them to question it. 

Honest to goodness, I wish Miller had said to the P2025 folks, “I know we’re supposed to let your rank partisanship permeate every bit of this project, but some things are too important to be relegated to your political ends.”  That would have been an act of uncommon courage.

Mark of St. Mark

The Department of Defense

I continue to read through and blog through the Heritage Foundation’s “Project 2025.” You can find it here. Section Two of P2025 is entitled, “The Common Defense” and it begins with an introduction (by someone) that notes that neither of the long-time honored parts of the executive branch – the Department of Defense (formerly “War Department”) and State Department – are living up to their standards and need to be put aright by the next president. I don’t want to jump the gun (so to speak), but as it turns out, it’s the Democrats’ fault. 

The first part of this section, “The Department of Defense (DOD),” is written by Christopher Miller, who held several posts within the Trump administration and formerly an army Green Beret and Colonel. He begins by citing a litany of problems that are taking a serious toll on the DOD, among which are “a two-tiered culture of accountability that shields senior officers and officials while exposing junior officers and soldiers in the field, wasteful spending, wildly shifting security policies, exceedingly poor discipline in program execution, and (most recently) the Biden Administration’s profoundly unserious equity agenda and vaccine mandates …”

Just a quick note: The DOD is huge and, therefore, probably does have a boatload of issues to address, constantly and across many changes of leadership. The DOD consistently is called to areas that are dangerous and life-threatening, so those issue are genuinely matters of life and death, whether for US troops, enemy combatants, or civilians caught in the crossfire. Miller’s choice to name the Biden Administration is not surprising given the manifest intent of this whole document, but it is disheartening. If he really were as interested in de-politicizing military decisions (p.92), this chapter could have gone a long way of demonstrating how. For example, if “wildly shifting security policies” contribute to the current problems for the DOD, why not name the Trump Administration’s complete 180 on NATO and his accommodating stance toward Kim Jung Un and Vladamir Putin as stunning examples? Miller does mention later, “The United States and its allies also face real threats from Russia, as evidenced by Vladimir Putin’s brutal war in Ukraine …” but does not cop up to how the administration of which he was a part dissed US allies and encouraged Russia. And “vaccine mandates”? That’s only a “problem” if people stubbornly refuse to do what their commanders deem are best for their safety based on the best available science. 

Miller also argues that the DOD should make providing support to the Department of Homeland Security its 3rd overriding priority. The DOD’s 3rd overriding priority! 

There seem to be two issues at play here. First, the militarization of the border reflects a tendency to suspect all immigrants as dangerous. Because it is illegal to enter the US by any means other than ports of entry (air, sea, or land), any immigrant crossing the border outside of those ports are breaking US laws the moment they cross. So, it is easy to call them “criminals” and justify it on those grounds. The problem is when the “criminality” of crossing over the border is equated with being “criminals that rape, kill, import drugs, and eat pets.” That kind of rhetoric manifestly irresponsible. But so is describing border security as the 3rd highest priority of the Department of Defense. 

Second, one can certainly see some border crossings as threats to national security – especially if they bring narcotics and cartel-backed gang violence with them. If we note that danger, we also have to admit that the number one reason there is so much money in the drug trade is because there is so much demand for illegal drugs in the US. The millions of dollars that we see drug lords spending started out in diversified US citizens’ pockets before they bought drugs. 

I’ve only touched the beginnings of Miller’s essay. It has a lot of information and much of it sounds important to hear. So, stay tuned. 

When You Hear "Bureaucracy ..."

I continue to read through the massive Project 2025, which has been criticized both seriously and comically, and which has become something of a stain from which the Trump Campaign has tried to distance itself, although it has been written by many former Trump appointees and with a future Trump (or Trump-like) administration in mind. The next major section of P2025 is a chapter entitled “Central Personnel Agencies: Managing the Bureaucracy” (p. 69 of the document; p.101 of the online version,) By Donald Devine, Dennis Dean Kirk, and Paul Dans. I begin with two notes.

First, a few words about one of the principal authors, Paul Dans. Dans was the Director of the P2025 initiative but left the project in August and is now working on a number of issues to which he refers as “election integrity” issues. According to this article by Ken Bensinger, one of those issues is a restoration of “Schedule F” classifications for many federal jobs. Schedule F, passed during the Trump administration but rescinded by President Biden, makes it easier to fire civil servants and replace them with party loyalists. And there’s this quote from Bensinger’s article: “The heart of the Heritage Foundation-funded project, Mr. Dans said, was a database of roughly 20,000 party loyalists who were vetted and ready to fill positions in a Republican administration.” In other words, Mr. Dans' essay is part of a larger planned effort to rid the government’s bureaucracy of civil servants, not necessarily based on their job performance or integrity, but on whether they are deemed “faithful” enough to serve the President’s agenda. Again, one must ask, “What if a President’s agenda conflicts with legal, ethical, or constitutional integrity?” I wish that were a ridiculous question, since presidents take oaths swearing fidelity to the constitution. After January 6, 2021, it no longer seems like a ridiculous question to me.  

Second, I read this section as a person whose father was a civil servant, working for NASA throughout my childhood. I remember well how often my parents would try to make plans for the forthcoming year, deciding whether they could afford a home improvement project or a family vacation to a state park, but could only be tentative about it, because Dad did not know whether he would get a COLA or not. His job – and our family’s livelihood as a result – was always something of a political football. He was a model-maker, making wings or aeronautical models to test in the wind tunnels, hence one of many civil servants who were subject annually to political whims or an ambitious politician’s plans to curry popularity by cutting costs. Those conversations are important, no doubt, but the politicization of those conversations have always struck me as the primary reason why bureaucracy has a bad name. A government serving a country of over 330 million people is a tall task, easy to criticize and difficult to manage well. Therefore, there will always be a reason for people to address “managing the bureaucracy” as this chapter does. 

Dans et al give an overview of numerous attempts to manage the civil service, going back to the Carter administration. No doubt it is a daunting task. One issue he finds important is his argument that the unionization of government workers is incompatible with government management, invoking none other than President Franklin Roosevelt for his case. He lauds three executive orders that the Trump administration issued, each of which tries to empower management over unions. Note the phrase “management rights.”

Executive Order 13836, encouraging agencies to renegotiate all union collective bargaining agreements to ensure consistency with the law and respect for management rights; Executive Order 13837, encouraging agencies to prevent union representatives from using official time preparing or pursuing grievances or from engaging in other union activity on government time; Executive Order 13839, encouraging agencies both to limit labor grievances on removals from service or on challenging performance appraisals and to prioritize performance over seniority when deciding who should be retained following reductions-in-force.

It’s the next section where it feels that the issue comes to a head: “Fully Staffing the Ranks of Political Appointees.” The writers say that a President is constitutionally required to fill top political positions in the executive branch and admit that most Presidents have struggled to do so because of the requirement for congressional approval. Let me interject that the requirement for congressional approval is as much a part of the government’s process of checks and balances as anything else, but this essay seems to see that part of the process as a problem. They argue that President Trump faced special hostility from democrats and the media in getting his appointees considered and approved. There are clearly two sides to this argument and numerous other administrations that might feel the same. 

In the end, this chapter is another argument in a long history of two familiar tendencies – to prefer managerial rights over employee rights, and to de-centralizing much of civil service from Federal to State responsibilities – the point of which seems to ensure a structure that is not accountable to checks and balances but compliant to a president’s will, even if it is harmful to the common good. 

P2025 the OMB and other Executive Offices

I continue to work through “Project 2025.” This week a good friend sent me this link, which argues that “The details of Project 2025 are buried in a dense 900+ page PDF document, yet they have the potential to impact every American. This site was created to help you quickly understand how Project 2025 could affect the things you care about.” It has tools by which you can explore specific areas of concern that you may have. Thanks, Mary!  

The next section of P2025 (pp. 75-100) is an essay entitled “Executive Office of the President of the United States,” by Russ Vought. Vought is another former Trump cabinet member (Director of the Office of Management and Budget or OMB) and the founder and president of the Center for Renewing America. From the get-go, Vought seems determined to carry both the confusion and the vitriol of P2025 forward. He begins by noting that Article II of the U.S. Constitution invests executive power in the President, but quickly says that a modern President inherits a “sprawling federal bureaucracy that all too often is carrying out its own policy and preferences – or, worse yet, the policy plans and preferences of a radical, supposedly ‘woke’ faction of the country.” The “confusion” to which I refer comes from this: Vought himself was once a part of that “sprawling bureaucracy.” The OMB, while sometimes referred to as one of the smaller offices, employs about 450 persons. The “vitriol” to which I refer is Vought’s early onset of us/them language, because the problem of a sprawling bureaucracy is not when does a conservative president’s bidding, but when it has a different vision that can be named by the shorthand term “woke.” And with that, we move beyond the first paragraph. 

Vought’s essay is about the work of the OMB and what he sees as necessary changes in order for the next conservative presidency to be able to implement its will both with regard to budgeting and management. Likening the OMB to the control tower of an airport, Vought argues strongly that the OMB should be privy to all areas of governmental actions, in order to hold other agencies to the president’s vision. Here, Vought shows a difference between the role of the OMB when Trump was in office and the role under the Biden Administration. On pp. 45-46 of the online version, he argues for giving Program Associate Directors (PADs) control over apportionments, rather than Deputy Associate Directors (DADs). The Trump administration gave the oversight to PADs, while the Biden administration reverted back to the DADs. The point – it seems, to someone like me who is not terribly invested in learning the finer points of the bureaucracy – is to streamline the bureaucracy in order to ensure control and fiscal prudence. The issues behind PADs and DADs is one of many structural arguments that Vought offers in pp. 45ff. 

On p.49 one can see one of the effects of Vought’s streamlining. Regarding the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), Vought argues that the point is “reining in the regulatory state and ensuring that regulations achieve important benefits while imposing minimal burdens on Americans.” He further argues for reinstating many of the executive orders that President Trump signed to make the regulatory system “more just, efficient, and transparent.” I am not one who is qualified to address the maze of offices and acronyms that Vought presents. I am aware, however, that many regulations over health hazards, pollutants, and safety have often been resisted as burdensome to “Americans,” as if those whose life and livelihood are being protected do not belong to that category as much as those whose profit is being protected. So, I admit my own bias and suspicions that part of the effect of streamlining the process to fit the next conservative president’s agenda is to make health and safety regulations harder to pass and enforce. 

It seems ironic that, like Dearborn before him, Vought seems to recognize the need for multiple offices and layers of bureaucracy needed to coordinate them. He goes on to talk about the National Security Council, National Economic Council, Office of the US Trade Representative, Council of Economic Advisors, National Space Council, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Council of Environmental Quality, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Gender Policy Council, and the Office of the Vice President. As one might imagine, within his streamlining of the Council of Environmental Quality, Vought encourages the next president to instruct this council to rewrite its regulations along the lines of the efforts of the Trump administration, including, “restoring its key provisions such as banning the use of cumulative impact analysis” as well as abolishing the working group on the Social Costs of Carbon (SCC), and end using SCC analyses. This seems like a move to stop environmentally sensitive regulations in favor of business-friendly regulations. Likewise, one will not be surprised to learn that Vought simply wants to eliminate the Gender Policy Council because it is simply a tool of “woke” ideology. 

Sigh. 

 

P 2025, the Aug. 29 edition

Last week I began looking at Richard Dearborn’s essay on “The White House Office.” It offers an interesting overview of the roles of many governmental positions that one hears about in passing but may know nothing about in particular. From Dearborn’s position as the Deputy Chief of Staff in the Trump administration, he knows well what it is that these persons in these roles do. This essay could be a helpful introduction to Washington curious, but it does come with an agenda. As I pointed out last week, by naming loyalty to the president and the Constitution as the primary credential for the While House Counsel (p.28), Dearborn skirts one of the more obvious challenges of the Trump administration – when loyalty to the president means disloyalty to the constitution. Just ask former Vice President Pence, whose constitutional role presiding over the Senate was not in service to or answerable to the Executive branch of government. Still he was deemed disloyal for doing his constitutional duty and not doing President Trump’s bidding. 

Much of Dearborn’s essay sounds descriptive, but it is evident that it also has an agenda as part of a larger section called “Taking the Reins of Government.” When Dearborn writes about the work of the White House Communications Director, he helpfully describes the need for this Director to be informed of the breadth of White House activities, as well as having quick-minded skills to fend off or redirect questions, even rebutting the presumptions behind a question, in order to stay on message. To be fair, it strikes me that Communications Directors of every political stripe at every political level face the challenge of whether they are communicating the truth per se, the truth as the know it, or the truth that their office wants communicated. 

The context to keep in mind here is the role of the free press in the US and the extent to which a politician, elected by and for the people, is accountable to it. Particularly in a day when social media enables virtually anyone to publicize claims that may or may not be true, a free press is recognized as a necessary safeguard against political hubris that disguises itself in savvy press releases. At the same time, news media in the US are not perfect, are often driven by economic necessity, and one must recognize the perspectival nature of any news source. News media are both necessary and need to be highly scrutinized. One way that press associations have tried to ensure some level of accountability for their work has been through the White House Correspondents Association (WHCA), known chiefly through questions raised in the White House briefing room or aboard Air Force One, as well as by the WHCA dinner each year, where barbs and teasing flies back and forth between politicians, press, and guests. For over 100 years, the WHCA has encouraged governmental transparency by through press conferences and has encouraged press accountability by requiring White House correspondents to be credentialed by the Standing Committee of Correspondents. Again, the context here is the role of the free press to ensure governmental accountability by insisting on “the people’s right to know.” 

It is disheartening then when Dearborn continues the “us v. them” rhetoric of P2025 saying, “The new Administration should examine the nature of the relationship between itself and the White House Correspondents Association and consider whether an alternative coordinating body might be more suitable” (p.30). In plain English, this is an invitation for the next President to destroy a century-old process of accountability and replace it a body of reportage that is hand-picked, or “more suitable.” So, not only has Dearborn paved a way for the Communication Director to offer information that is loyal to the president’s agenda, he is encouraging the administration to ensure that the CD will present that information to a press corps that is also deemed loyal, marking the end of accountability and an invitation for hubris. 

Again, this would be a wonderfully informative essay about the various roles within the White House if it weren’t contextualized within such a blatant maneuver to dismantle hard won structures of accountability surrounding a president. 

MD